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Abstract
The same dilemma remains for those in Northern Ireland today who genuinely want peace,
reconciliation, and stability, but who at the same time see in what is termed the peace process,
if not deceit, then much glossing over, a lot of ambiguity, and a deal of bad history. In 1921 the
new institutions in Northern Ireland, the regional government and Parliament began life under the
fiercest onslaught from Irish nationalism, both within its own boundaries and from the rest of the
island. It was also critical of the early peace process under which John Hume of the SDLP had
commenced dialogue with the representative of terrorism, Gerry Adams, and also under which
democratic governments in London and Dublin were preparing to negotiate, or were already nego-
tiating, with minority terrorist groups that they had long vowed to pursue relentlessly. The closing
of nationalist ranks, including the Dublin Government, SDLP and Irish- America behind Sinn Fein
in pressurising the British Government to accommodate Republican demands, meant the broader
dialogue on a settlement in Northern Ireland was submerged in “conflict resolution” between a
minority terrorist group and the British state.
DASH FOR AGREEMENT: TEMPORARY
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Dennis Kennedy*
If deceit is acceptable to win a war, why should it not be
equally acceptable, say, to preserve a peace, asked Conor Cruise
O'Brien in his introduction to Writers and Politics.1 He was dis-
cussing the role of the intellectual in society in the 1960s, with
particular reference to the Cold War. Much more recently, the
Nigerian Nobel Prize-winning playwright, Wole Soyinka, posed a
similar question in a different context when he asked to what
extent, if any, should the past be glossed over for the sake of
social tranquillity here and now.2 The same dilemma remains
for those in Northern Ireland today who genuinely want peace,
reconciliation, and stability, but who at the same time see in
what is termed the peace process, if not deceit, then much glos-
sing over, a lot of ambiguity, and a deal of bad history.
Northern Ireland has not, in recent years at least, suffered
from a lack of intellectual attention. It has proved an accessible
laboratory for conflict theorists, peace scholars, students of iden-
tities, and urban guerrilla specialists. Northern Ireland has of-
fered the chance to study, in the context of a late twentieth-cen-
tury Europe moving towards integration, a problem with more
than faint echoes of the religious wars of the distant past.
No one in Ireland, North or South, readily takes upon him-
self the title of intellectual, for to do so invites immediate inclu-
sion in what the late Spiro Agnew termed that "effete corps of
impudent snobs,"' or, in the more gentle parlance of the island,
to be deemed "badly out of touch." However, the greatly in-
creased output of academic analysis of the Irish situation over
the past quarter of a century, from the disciplines of history,
political science, and economics, has produced at least some as-
sessments of the problem. These assessments are more intellec-
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1. CONOR CRUISE O'BREN, WRITERS AND POLITICS at xvii (1965).
2. WOLE SOVINKA, THE BURDEN OF MEMORY, THE MUSE OF FORGIVENESS (1998).
3. Spiro Agnew, Speech in New Orleans, Louisiana (Oct. 19, 1969).
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tually objective than overtly political, even if, as Thomas Mann
has reminded us, every intellectual attitude is latently political.
When the seemingly interminable crisis extended into the
1990s and thus into a third decade, with continued terrorist vio-
lence and worsening community relations, some observers be-
came increasingly persuaded that one reason for this state of af-
fairs was that too many interpretations were obscuring the real
issues, and that received wisdom and official policy were based
on an incorrect analysis of the problem and its origins and was,
in fact, tending to prolong instability rather than end it. Sharing
these concerns was a small group in Belfast who, familiar with
one another's published work, though not otherwise linked per-
sonally or politically, had come together for regular discussion of
the problem. They included specialists in Irish history and poli-
tics, in economics, in the European Union, and in public admin-
istration. Their original intention was to inform themselves and
one another through discussion, but they soon realized that if
they were to make any contribution to resolving the problem,
they would have to enter public debate. This they did through
the publication of pamphlets under the name of the Cadogan
Group.4
The Group saw, and still sees itself as independent in that,
as a group, it has no links to any political party, and because it
has not collectively committed itself to the upholding of any par-
ticular political viewpoint. As the Group put it, perhaps some-
what pompously, in its first pamphlet published in 1992,' the
Group's primary concern was "to hold to realism and discard any
analysis or agenda stemming primarily from either a nationalist
or a unionist philosophy." But the Group also stated that its
members had been brought together by a common concern that
Government policy in Northern Ireland was based on an incor-
rect assessment of the problem and its origins, which drew too
readily on a nationalist or neo-nationalist analysis. This errone-
4. The original members of the Group were Arthur Aughey (political scientist),
Paul Bew (political scientist), Arthur Green (retired public servant), Graham Gudgin
(economist), Dennis Kennedy (historian and European affairs expert), and Patrick
Roche (economist). The group was named after the address at which its members first
met, not directly after the fifth Earl Cadogan, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 1895-1902.
5. Northern Limits: Boundaries of the Attainable in Northern Ireland Politics (visited Jan.
31, 1999) <http://www.cadogan.org/cadogan/pamps/north.html> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
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ous analysis was widespread, and largely unchallenged among
observers and commentators in Britain, the Republic, North
America, and continental Europe.
This frank rejection of the nationalist approach inevitably
drew accusations of unionism upon the Group, but as articulated
in the Group's publications, it was based on the sheer unsus-
tainability of much of the traditional nationalist case. Taking the
base line of the present problem as the partition of Ireland in
1921 to satisfy the conflicting claims of a majority for indepen-
dence for the island and of a substantial and concentrated mi-
nority demanding maintenance of the existing state, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, partition could be seen as
a reasonable, if not entirely satisfactory, solution.
Much recent writing of Irish history has taken this view, but
the Group felt that it was useful to try to insert it into the then
current political debate. It argued that the nationalist case, that
the people of the island constituted an Irish nation with a right
to ownership of the island and that partition was therefore un-
just and undemocratic, rested on an outdated concept of na-
tionhood belonging more to the nineteenth century than to the
twenty-first century. In the case of Ireland, the Group argued
that there was a territorially-based nationalism that was even
more difficult to sustain. The argument that the line of partition
was artificially drawn to guarantee a unionist majority in North-
ern Ireland simply indicates the fatuity of much nationalist po-
lemic-of course it was drawn to give a unionist majority because
that was the whole point of partition.
Partition left unhappy minorities on both sides of the bor-
der, as many European borders have done in the course of the
twentieth century. In southern Ireland the unionist minority
either left or ceased being unionist and accepted their new sta-
tus as Irish citizens. In Northern Ireland the proportionately
larger nationalist minority refused to accept the legitimacy of the
state in which they found themselves, initially refused to partici-
pate in its institutions, and then organized themselves politically
with the principal aim of dismantling the state.
Across the patchwork of European states in the twentieth
century numerous minorities-ethnic, linguistic, and religious-
have accommodated themselves to living on the wrong sides of
borders. Their efforts, and the efforts of European states and
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international organizations, have been dedicated to easing the
lot of isolated minorities and to guaranteeing their civil and
other rights, not to redrawing borders and dismantling states.
This process of assimilation or accommodation did not happen
in Northern Ireland, or at least happened only to a limited ex-
tent. Various factors worked against it. One has been the territo-
rial nature of Irish nationalism; the concept of Irishness has
been strongly linked to the island, personified in titles such as
Caithleen ni Houlihaun, Dark Rosaleen, or the Shan Van Voght.
The romantic attachment has been more explicitly to the physi-
cal island than to nationhood, the island being more demonstra-
bly separate and distinct than the mixed peoples of the two is-
lands sharing-race, language, and, broadly speaking, religion-
could ever be.
The fact that the disputed territory was on the island of Ire-
land, and physically separated from the rest of the state of which
it was a part, added a superficial validity to the nationalist claim
and made the problem in Ireland unlike other territorial dis-
putes in Europe. Another major difference was that within the
disputed territory the secessionists were in a minority, a fact that
has been confirmed by repeated democratic elections over half a
century. Thus, it was not possible, as in South Tyrol for exam-
ple, to give the discontented community a large degree of con-
trol over its own affairs under regional autonomy within the ex-
isting state boundaries. Nationalists in Northern Ireland have
never demanded self-determination for themselves. Rather,
their claim has always been to the whole territory of Northern
Ireland, within which they are a minority.
Partition came at the- end of a short but extremely violent
struggle between Irish nationalism and the British Empire. At
the time, and much more subsequently, it was highly romanti-
cized and accorded heroic status. Just as David triumphed over
Goliath, however, partition soured the victory. Nationalists on
both sides of the border were left with unfinished business, an
outsized sense of grievance, and a pantheon of violent heroes.
The idea that partition was morally unjust was sustained by
the rhetoric of political leaders of the new Irish state and was
formally enshrined in De Valera's 1937 Constitution, which de-
fined the national territory as the whole island and asserted the
right, in principle, of Dublin to rule over it. Inside Northern
Ireland the persistent refusal of a large element of the national-
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ist population to accept the legitimacy of the state, and the con-
centration of the political activity of this element on pursuit of
the nationalist goal of Irish unification, helped to ensure the
continuing division of politics in Northern Ireland along nation-
alist-unionist lines. This continuing division thereby ensured
that nationalists remained a permanent political minority, who
are excluded, essentially by their own choice, from a chance to
share in government of the province.
In 1921 the new institutions in Northern Ireland, the re-
gional government and Parliament began life under the fiercest
onslaught from Irish nationalism, both within its own bounda-
ries and from the rest of the island. The IRA sought to destroy
Northern Ireland by bombing, burning, and killing. This cam-
paign was backed by an economic boycott that Dublin organ-
ized, by non-recognition of the northern state by nationalists in-
side it and by the southern state, and by a sustained diplomatic
and propaganda drive against Northern Ireland.
In these circumstances it was hardly surprising, though
nonetheless regrettable, that the new Unionist Government in
Belfast soon forgot the sentiments expressed in 1921 by its
leader, Sir James Craig. He declared that the new executive and
parliament had to govern "the whole people of the province,"
and that "the rights of the minority must be sacred to the major-
ity, and that it will only be by broad views, tolerant ideas and a
real desire for liberty of conscience that we here can make an
ideal of the parliament and the executive."6
Instead, unionist rule in Northern Ireland became generally
associated with intolerance and discrimination against the na-
tionalist/Catholic minority. The New Ireland Forum Report of
1984 claimed that for fifty years nationalists had "suffered sys-
tematic discrimination. They were deprived of the means of so-
cial and economic development." Unionists were indeed guilty
of various acts of discrimination and made little effort to draw
the minority into the body politic. As David Trimble said in his
Nobel Prize acceptance speech, they built a solid house, but it
was a cold house for Catholics.
The evidence for the Forum Report's seeping generaliza-
tion is, however, debatable and is hardly consistent with the pop-
6. Speech at the Reform Club, Belfast (Feb. 7, 1921), in DENNIS KENNEDY, THE
WIDENING GULF 59 (1988).
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ulation statistics of both parts of the island. Between 1926 and
1961, as the official census returns show, the number of
Catholics in Northern Ireland increased by eighteen percent,
while the total population increase was thirteen percent; over
the same period the Catholic population of the South, hit by
economic problems similar to those in the North, declined by al-
most three percent, and the Protestant population declined by
thirty-seven percent. Numerous factors contributed to such sta-
tistics, but they do argue very strongly against any idea of the
Catholics as a sorely-oppressed minority in Northern Ireland.
Nevertheless, there was enough discrimination, coupled with the
very public intransigence of many Unionist leaders, to make the
minority's perception of itself as exceedingly hard done by a seri-
ous and seemingly permanent factor in the problem.
The perception persists that the problem in Northern Ire-
land lies essentially in the denial by the majority of civil or even
human rights to the minority. The fact that the current troubles
began in the 1960s in the context of a civil rights campaign has
fixed this in the popular mind. But the civil rights demands of
the 1960s were very limited, and specific grievances were met
almost in their entirety within a very short period. Since the sus-
pension of devolved government in 1972, unionists have been
excluded from exercising any governmental power at regional
level.
The sense of historic grievance over partition and of nation-
alists as a persecuted minority were married in one key assertion
of the New Ireland Forum, which demanded for nationalists in
Northern Ireland the right to political expression of their Irish identity.
This demand was made in the context of allegations of denial of
civil rights in Northern Ireland, with the implication that this
was also a basic right. In fact, as a careful reading of the Forum
Report makes clear, it is a new formulation of a basic nationalist
demand, political expression meaning not just the freedom to
campaign for Irish unity, but the right to be associated in some
way with the independent Irish state, and indeed to be part of it.
This is a formulation that finds no echo in international agree-
ments on individual rights or on the treatment of minorities.
The Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protec-
tion of National Minorities, which entered into force in February
1998 and is probably the most comprehensive internationally-
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agreed-upon statement of individual and group rights of minori-
ties, contains nothing remotely akin to it.
The New Ireland Forum Report of 1984 was hailed as a com-
prehensive and intelligent presentation of the nationalist case,
but it ignored the insights of the recent scholarship that had car-
ried the writing of Irish history out of its outdated confines. At
most, the Report conceded that the ideal of an independent
Irish unitary state might not be a practical possibility, suggesting
as alternatives a federal Irish state or joint British-Irish authority
over Northern Ireland.
While Mrs. Thatcher initially, and abruptly, rejected all
three options of the Forum Report, it soon became clear that the
U.K. Government was increasingly prepared to accept at least
the rhetoric of the nationalist case. In particular, the U.K. Gov-
ernment was prepared to satisfy the key demand of the Forum,
that nationalists in Northern Ireland be given some means of
expressing politically their Irish identity.
The right of the Irish Government to be consulted by
London on Northern Ireland, and to some degree to act as a
guarantor for the northern minority, had been conceded in the
early 1970s. From that point on, the achievement of a Dublin-
London consensus on Northern Ireland was a priority for all
U.K. Governments. In the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, 7 Dub-
lin's role as guarantor was formalized, and it was given a treaty-
based right to advise on the internal administration of Northern
Ireland and a set of institutions to enable it to do so.
The intellectual argument behind the Anglo-Irish Agree-
ment was indeed related to the Forum's "right to political ex-
pression of an Irish identity." By giving the Irish Government a
visible role, albeit advisory, in the administration of Northern
Ireland through the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference
and a physical presence in Belfast through the Anglo-Irish Secre-
tariat, it was hoped that northern nationalists might indeed feel
that they could now see their Irish identity expressed in the exer-
cise of government.
Had the Anglo-Irish Agreement been accepted in Northern
7. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland, Nov. 15, 1985,
U.K.-Ir., Cmnd. 9657, reprinted in TOM HADDEN & KEVIN BOYLE, THE ANGLO-IRISH
AGREEMENT 15-48 (1989).
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Ireland, and. a power-sharing devolved administration set up in
Belfast, some of these hopes might have been realized. For that
to have happened, there would have had to have been more evi-
dence that the agreement was indeed a settlement, rather than a
stage in a process. Ambiguity in the wording of the two Govern-
ments' guarantee on the status of Northern Ireland, coupled
with the failure to remove the territorial claim to Northern Ire-
land in the Irish Constitution, helped to convince the unionist
majority, who had been excluded from any part in negotiating
the Anglo-Irish Agreement, that a significant shift had been
made towards affording Dublin joint responsibility for Northern
Ireland.
Joint British-Irish authority over Northern Ireland has been
advocated for many years, mainly by nationalists, and usually as
an interim arrangement pending Irish unification. The SDLP
put it forward in its policy document Towards a New Ireland, is-
sued in 1972; it was one of the three options of the New Ireland
Forum Report of 1984. The British Labour Party favored it in
Options for a Labour Government, published in 1991, and it was
spelled out in some detail as a solution in pro-Labour Institute
for Public Policy Research document Northern Ireland: Shared Au-
thority, 1993. The Cadogan Group pamphlet Blurred Vision: Joint
Authority and the Northern Ireland Problem, 1994, discusses the is-
sue.
A substantial majority within Northern Ireland unequivo-
cally rejected the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and the envisaged
cross-community devolved executive never came into existence.
By the end of the 1980s, it was clear to both London and Dublin
that the agreement was not going to solve the problem. Multi-
party talks were resumed under Secretary of State Peter Brooke
in 1991, and his successor Sir Patrick Mayhew in 1992, with the
Dublin Government also involved; unofficially, talks began else-
where between the Social Democratic and Labour Party and
Sinn Fain, and between the U.K. Government and the Provi-
sional IRA.
A major shift in the Government's approach to the problem
had taken place. Until the late 1980s, the official policy, in both
London and Dublin, had been to conduct a resolute security
campaign against IRA terrorism, while at the same time seeking
to isolate the terrorists by reaching a political accommodation
with moderate, non-violent nationalism. The Anglo-Irish Agree-
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ment had emerged from such an approach, with its immediate
aim being to strengthen the SDLP in Northern Ireland against
the advances of Sinn Fain. By the end of the 1980s, the goal of
defeating terrorism had been effectively abandoned, and the
push was on for a peace process that would include the terrorists
and be based on inclusive negotiations involving Sinn Fain.
But if the Anglo-Irish Agreement was now seen not to be the
answer, the Anglo-Irish consensus on which it was based was now
officially' espoused more strongly than ever. The search for a
solution would still be pursued in seeking to accommodate the
nationalist minority in Northern Ireland, not only by guarantee-
ing full protection of their rights within the British state, but also
by further rhetorical concessions to the nationalist case and by
more closely associating the Dublin Government in the adminis-
tration of Northern Ireland. The analysis that the Cadogan
Group and others were questioning was still the basis of policy.
By 1992, the U.K. Government was frankly admitting its neu-
trality on the constitutional future of Northern Ireland. It stood
by its guarantee, included in the Anglo-Irish Agreement, that the
status of Northern Ireland could change only with the consent of
the people of Northern Ireland. In a key speech at Coleraine in
December 1992, however, Sir Patrick Mayhew emphasized that
the U.K. Government had no self-interest in Northern Ireland
and was not pursuing any constitutional settlenent of its own
choice. Rather, the U.K. Government was simply seeking to fa-
cilitate the democratic Will of the people of Northern Ireland on
their own future.
This idea was later incorporated in the Downing Street Dec-
laration as a statement by the British Government that it had "no
selfish, strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland" and
caused great offense to the unionist majority, who saw it as a
formal and outrageous disavowal by a democratic government of
its responsibility towards its territory and its citizens. But what
Sir Patrick was saying was little more than a blunter version of
what had been reality for many years; Northern Ireland was part
of the United Kingdom, not because the United Kingdom
wished to exercise any historic claim to its territory, or because
retention of it was central to the United Kingdom's vital inter-
ests, but simply because a majority in Northern Ireland wished to
remain within the United Kingdom.
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In large part, the speech was addressed directly towards the
IRA, with the message being that the IRA's real quarrel was not
with London, but with the people of Northern Ireland, that vio-
lence would never win Irish unity, but that Irish unity could cer-
tainly be discussed if the violence stopped. Sir Patrick described
the aspiration to Irish unity as "no less legitimate" than the legal
and constitutional reality of Northern Ireland within the United
Kingdom. In short, the speech was an invitation to the IRA to
end violence and to enter negotiations with Irish unity as part of
the agenda, and with the U.K. Government remaining neutral
on the constitutional issue.
The speech contained a reiteration of the Government's de-
termination to combat violence. "It is, and will remain, the first
priority of the Government to defeat terrorism," declared Sir
Patrick, quoting his predecessor, Peter Brooke. He then added
his own assurance that there could be "absolutely no question of
our dealing, directly or indirectly, with anyone who still espouses
violence." What Sir Patrick knew, but was not saying, was that his
government had, in fact, been dealing directly with the IRA and
Sinn Fain for about three years in search of a way of ending vio-
lence. The peace process, initiated publicly by John Hume and
Gerry Adams, and secretly by the U.K. Government and the IRA,
was under way.
A sea of change in Government policy had taken place. The
priority was no longer the defeat of terrorism but the achieve-
ment of an IRA cease-fire through discreet courtship of Sinn
F~in and the IRA. The very term "peace process" was an indica-
tion that negotiation with terrorism was now at the heart of pol-
icy-after all, the only war going on was between government
and society on the one hand, and the terrorists on the other.
This change of direction required a change of script for
many participants, and presented formidable challenges to
those, like the Cadogan Group, who were already challenging
the intellectual honesty of the existing established bilateral
London-Dublin policy centered on the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
Government was now openly accepting the traditional national-
ist claim to Northern Ireland at face value, and according it a
worth fully equal to that of the existing constitutional arrange-
ment. There was also further acceptance of the nationalist ver-
sion of Northern Ireland as a one-party state within which na-
tionalists or Catholics were a persecuted minority to such an ex-
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tent that they could never be fully reconciled to their position
within the United Kingdom, and that the minimum that they
could be expected to accept in the meantime was some form of
Irish-British joint responsibility for Northern Ireland.
It was no longer politic for moderate nationalists, or the
Dublin Government, to continue to dismiss the IRA as terrorists
engaged in criminal violence. Nor was it politic for John Hume
to say, as he had frequently in the past, that there was no cause
in Northern Ireland worth a single life. The message now was
that the IRA goal of Irish unity was worthy and realizable, but
that its methods were wrong. The sharp division between non-
violent nationalism and Republican terrorism became blurred
within a pan-nationalist front campaigning for "rights" and
"equality," the achievement of which would help to satisfy legiti-
mate nationalist aspirations and to remove the need for vio-
lence.
One astute Dublin-based observer, and former participant
in policy formation, was quick to seize upon the significance of
the Coleraine speech when he commented that this was the
right time for a "concentrated negotiation of a definitive solu-
tion in which the inequalities and wrongs which burden the mi-
nority (so usefully acknowledged by the Secretary of State) are
manifestly on the way to correction."' In fact, the Secretary of
State had not referred to any "wrongs" suffered by the minority.
He did refer to economic and social disadvantages in employ-
ment, educational under-attainment, and poor housing condi-
tions affecting both Protestant and Catholic communities.
These bore more heavily on the Catholic community, "for a vari-
ety of complex reasons having their roots deep in the past." He
talked of issues relating to the administration of justice and po-
licing strictly in the context of the abnormal situation arising
from the terrorist campaign, inferring that normality would au-
tomatically return with the end of terrorism. He spoke more
than once of a desire to meet the wishes of the nationalist or
Catholic community, and a main theme of the speech was the
Government's commitment to affording equal recognition to
the identities of each of the two communities.
These he had already defined as national identities, Irish or
British, or as identities of allegiance to the Irish or British states.
8. Michael Lillis, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 30, 1992, at 9.
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Not only would these identities have to be afforded equal legiti-
macy, but also they would have to be given appropriate expres-
sion in whatever new arrangements were made for governing
Northern Ireland. Just how appropriate expression of allegiance
to another state could be given to residents of the United King-
dom without any change in the constitutional status of Northern
Ireland, Sir Patrick did not explain. But the wording was very
close to that key demand in the New Ireland Forum Report for
"political expression of an Irish identity."
The agenda, therefore, was set for the ensuing period and
for the resolution of the problem. It was to be a "peace process,"
with its main thrust as persuading the terrorists, the defeat of
whom was still supposed to be the Government's main priority,
to desist from violence and to pursue Irish unity by peaceful
means. Its other themes were to be accommodation of national-
ist demands and aspirations in terms of allowing political expres-
sion of their Irish identity, and second, taking on board the
more specific complaints of nationalism, particularly of Republi-
canism, regarding equality, administration of justice, and polic-
ing. All this was against the background of the continued guar-
antee that the constitutional position of Northern Ireland could
not change without the support of a majority in the province.
Some five and a half years later, that agenda produced this ap-
proach of May 13, 1998.
As a political strategy, at least in the short to medium term,
this approach had much to commend it to those in government.
It took account of the now publicly admitted inability of the se-
curity forces to defeat the IRA, and also of the difficulties caused
to the IRA by war-weariness and some division among its sup-
porters. It ensured continued full cooperation on Northern Ire-
land with the Dublin Government. It seemed likely to win en-
thusiastic backing from moderate nationalism and from the
wider community in Britain, the United States, and the Euro-
pean Union. It offered the possibility of finally taking the gun
out of Irish politics by including the IRA itself in a negotiated
end to an unprecedented two decades of violence.
It also allowed the two Governments off the hook of union-
ist rejection of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. That Agreement
would now go, to be replaced, or transcended, by a new agree-
ment in the negotiation of which the unionists would be in-
volved. And the trump card in that negotiation would be peace.
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If the IRA could be persuaded to deliver a cease-fire, then enor-
mous pressure would come to bear on the unionist parties not to
reject peace.
It was at that point, in late 1992, that the Cadogan Group's
first pamphlet appeared. This pamphlet was sharply critical of
the government policy of seeking to accommodate the political
aspirations of nationalism, and of the seemingly widespread ac-
ceptance in London, Dublin, and elsewhere, that partition had
been somewhat unwise and immoral and that nationalists had
been an oppressed minority who still suffered much injustice. It
argued, on the basis of recent research and statistical evidence,
that while there had been discrimination against Catholics
under unionist rule, there was no evidence of widespread and
systematic discrimination and that the "nationalist nightmare"
was a politically-motivated myth. It was also critical of the early
peace process under which John Hume of the SDLP had com-
menced dialogue with the representative of terrorism, Gerry Ad-
ams, and also under which democratic governments in London
and Dublin were preparing to negotiate, or were already negoti-
ating, with minority terrorist groups that they had long vowed to
pursue relentlessly.
Like a growing number of distinguished individuals in Dub-
lin and London, the Group was arguing from principle, from the
lessons of history, and from the experience of post-war Europe,
that the nationalist case was intellectually and historically unsus-
tainable. Furthermore, the Group was arguing that the problem
was best tackled according to the established European pattern
of regarding borders as fixed and devoting best efforts to accom-
modating minorities within those borders, with the fullest possi-
ble guarantees of civil rights. Far from doing that, official policy
on Northern Ireland seemed to be encouraging hopes and fears
of Irish unification, thereby guaranteeing continued instability,
not settlement, and seriously exacerbating relations between the
two communities.
This was not to argue that the minority problem in North-
ern Ireland was sufficiently straightforward that resolute confir-
mation of the constitutional status quo was all that was needed to
settle the issue and to persuade the minority to reach a modus
vivendi in the state in which they found themselves, as had hap-
pened in many similar situations across Europe. For the reasons
outlined earlier, Northern Ireland was somewhat different, and
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added to those factors was the size of the disaffected minority
within the disputed territory and the length of time that disaffec-
tion had persisted. There was, therefore, a need for imaginative,
innovative, and perhaps unique approaches. Thus, the Cadogan
Group accepted that a return to simple majority rule in North-
ern Ireland was not possible and that the nationalist minority
had to be guaranteed a share in the exercise of authority. There
was also a recognition of the importance of the "island dimen-
sion," particularly to nationalists-the identification with the is-
land of Ireland, the common history and culture that all inhabit-
ants of the island shared, and the need to take account of this in
any settlement. A considerable degree of Irish unity exists; many
bodies, including all churches, are organized on an all-Ireland
basis. Unionists, while rejecting Irish nationality in the political
sense, have little difficulty belonging to a variety of clubs, teams,
churches, and professional bodies, the Irishness of which lies in
their organization on an all-Ireland basis. The challenge was to
persuade nationalists that their Irishness could find adequate ex-
pression in many ways other than living within an independent
Irish state, or having that state share authority over Northern Ire-
land.
The internal contradictions implicit in official policies
emerged again December 1993 when the two Governments
sought to draw all parties into negotiation through the Downing
Street Declaration. Once again Irish unification was discussed as
a real possibility, with a joint promise to facilitate it if consent is
forthcoming inside Northern Ireland, alongside the guarantee
that there could be no change in the constitutional status of
Northern Ireland without majority consent, the latter provision
making the former impossible. The whole thrust of the Declara-
tion is to promote agreement "in Ireland" and among the peo-
ples "of Ireland." The fundamental principle of Irish national-
ism, the "democratic right of self-determination of the people of
Ireland as a whole," is asserted, unchallenged, in the document
by the Taoiseach. The principle was, however, qualified immedi-
ately by his acceptance that it must be "achieved and exercised
with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of
the people of Northern Ireland." Thus, the intellectually in-
defensible concept that the people living on the island of Ire-
land constitute one nation and therefore have a collective right
of self-determination is accepted in principle, only to be effec-
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tively denied by the accompanying qualification that it can be
exercised only in the restricted manner prescribed. The politi-
cian, desperately seeking short-term resolution of contradictory
aspirations, will defend the pragmatism of such a course; the an-
alyst, seeking to articulate fundamental principles as the best ba-
ses for real settlement, will point to the weaknesses and inherent
dangers of such formulations.
Peace of a sort came with the paramilitary cease-fires of the
second half of 1994, followed by renewed concentration on
bringing all parties, including the representatives of terrorism,
into a round-table negotiation. The two Governments'
Frameworks proposals of 1995 were intended to provide the
agenda for such talks.
These proposals contained the familiar mixture of conces-
sions of principle and language, circumscribed by modest practi-
cal proposals. The Cadogan Group was unenthusiastic, declar-
ing the Frameworks to be vague, confusing and mistaken, and in
parts unworkable.9 While critical of the practicality of many of
the proposals and of the rhetorical concessions made to nation-
alism, the Group was not totally dismissive of the Frameworks.
The Group conceded that the Frameworks could provide a start-
ing point, a focus for discussion, and that, sufficiently modified,
they might offer hope as a basis for a settlement.
The Group criticized London for allowing its policy to be
driven by short-term considerations and for relying on ambiguity
to help to maintain the paramilitary cease-fires. The Group also
warned both Governments that that they should be aware of the
damage that could be done to the long-term prospects for a real
settlement by fudging or bending principles in order to dissuade
extremist groups from returning to violence. "Appeasement
now may well help to preserve the peace of the cease-fires, but
could, in the longer term, make the achievement of a perma-
nent settlement much more difficult, having, meanwhile, gone
some way to illustrating that violence pays, even if payment is
delayed until the guns are silent."
The refusal of the paramilitaries, particularly the IRA, to
contemplate the surrender of their arms, now proved a major
9. Lost Accord: The 1995 Frameworks and the Search for a Settlement in Northern Ireland
(visited Jan. 31,1999) <http://www.cadogan.org/cadogan/pamps/accord.html> (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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obstacle to the opening of round-table talks. It was at this point,
in November 1995, that Sen. George Mitchell entered the scene.
He was named as chairman of an international body to consider
the decommissioning of illegally held arms, with a deadline to
report by the end of January 1996. The very term "decommis-
sioning," chosen by the two Governments, was a substantial con-
cession to the terrorists and set the tone for Senator Mitchell's
involvement. He was brought in as a professional facilitator, a
broker who could find a formula to get all the parties to the
table.
The international body reported in January 1996, and its
findings were immediately accepted by the two Governments
and were to form part of their peace strategy right up to the
Belfast Agreement of May 1998-as indeed, was Sen. Mitchell
himself. But the Mitchell Report was seriously flawed. The key
question that the international body was required to answer was
whether the terrorists, particularly the IRA, were clearly commit-
ted to giving up their illegally held arms. If they were, then a
method could be devised to allow this to happen, which would
open the way for inclusive negotiation. In short, were the IRA
now ready to give up violence and to espouse peaceful means
only; if they were, then the problem of disposal of their weapons
could be worked out.
The Mitchell answer was that there was "a clear commit-
ment (on the part of the paramilitary groups) . . . to work con-
structively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part
of the process of all-party negotiations."'" In reaching this deci-
sion, the international body cited the fact that the paramilitary
cease-fires had been in operation for a year and a half. The re-
port containing that statement was published on January 22,
1996. Barely two weeks later, on February 9, the IRA announced
its cease-fire was over and detonated a massive bomb in
London's docklands that killed two people and caused damage
worth more than US$100 million.
Even allowing for the careful wording of the Mitchell Re-
port-that the commitment was to "decommissioning as part of
the process of all-party negotiations," which had not yet begun-
the resumption of violence made nonsense of Mitchell's conclu-
10. International Body on the Decommissioning of Arms, Report of the Interna-
tional Body, Belfast, Dublin, Jan. 22, 1996.
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sion that the IRA had a clear commitment to giving up arms.
The citing of the continued cease-fire as evidence of this com-
mitment looked particularly foolish when it was realized that
while Mitchell was reaching his conclusion, the IRA was actually
planning its resumption of violence and beginning the process
of placing the bomb.
But not even the resumption of IRA violence could shake
the faith of the two Governments in inclusive negotiations with
the terrorists at the table. Nor could the violence shake the faith
of Senator Mitchell, who was invited back in July 1996 to accept
the role of chairman of plenary sessions in multi-party talks. His
appointment signalled the two Governments' determination to
see the talks to a conclusion. Senator Mitchell was deemed in-
dependent, in that he had no previous involvement in Ireland
and no specialist knowledge of Irish affairs. His task was not to
help to explore the subtleties of the Irish problem, but to be a
technician and a ringmaster who would drive the participants to
an agreement within the narrow confines already determined.
Indeed, increasingly from this point on, there was no room in
the talks process for any real debate about the causes of the divi-
sion in Northern Ireland or of the fundamental roots of the
problem.
By the time the Group's next pamphlet appeared, in Octo-
ber 1996,11 elections to a consultative forum had taken place in
Northern Ireland. An inclusive talks process had begun, albeit
somewhat fitfully, with Sinn F~in excluded because of the IRA's
return to terrorism. As it had become increasingly obvious that
both Governments were determined to include Sinn Fain in the
process, at almost any price, the Group's main target in Square
Circles was appeasement of terrorism. Reviewing the evolution of
policy over the previous four or five years, the Group com-
mented:
Under cover of the general euphoria surrounding the "peace
process" the essential character of dialogue in Northern Ire-
land had changed. What had been a search for a political
accommodation between the broad strands of nationalism
and unionism became more a negotiation between militant
11. Square Circles: Round Tables and the Path to Peace in Northern Ireland (visited Jan.
31, 1999) <http://www.cadogan.org/cadogan/pamps/square.html> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
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nationalism and the British state. The imperative of ensuring
that the cease-fire was maintained, or once broken, rein-
stated, dominated all other considerations, and threatened to
move matters to the plane the IRA and Sinn Fain had always
been seeking - that of a peace conference, an exercise in
"conflict resolution" to end hostilities between two sides
which had been pursuing their legitimate aims (legitimate in
their own eyes) by force of arms. The closing of nationalist
ranks, including the Dublin Government, SDLP and Irish-
America behind Sinn F~in in pressurising the British Govern-
ment to accommodate Republican demands, meant the
broader dialogue on a settlement in Northern Ireland was
submerged in "conflict resolution" between a minority terror-
ist group and the British state. The most damaging result of
this, and the one precisely desired by Republicans, has been a
post-facto legitimising of IRA terrorism. A small group long
denounced by the Irish Government, moderate nationalists
and many others, as ruthless and mindless terrorists who must
be suppressed, are now dignified as essential interlocutors,
without whom dialogue is not worth a penny candle.
The pamphlet accused the U.K. Government of blurring es-
sential democratic principles in its desire to keep Sinn Fain and
the IRA aboard the peace process. Efforts to restore the IRA
cease-fire had come close to open appeasement, and the govern-
ment was seeking to pressure local democratic parties to negoti-
ate directly with the representatives of armed terrorists. It was
difficult to see how such moves could end other than in failure.
Nine months after that was written, an IRA cease-fire was
again in place, and after a further nine months, multi-party
agreement was reached, with Sinn Fain on board alongside the
political representatives of Loyalist terrorist groups. In Ireland,
some prominent commentators who had been critical of the
peace process publicly apologized and said that they had got it
wrong. Between the conclusion of the Belfast Agreement and
the holding of the referendums on it, the Cadogan Group pub-
lished a pamphlet 12 neither backing nor rejecting the deal. In-
stead, it set out four distinct commentaries examining various
aspects of the agreement. During the referendum campaign
12. Rough Trade: Negotiating a Northern Ireland Settlement (visited Jan. 31, 1999)
<http://www.cadogan.org/cadogan/pamps/rough.html> (on file with the Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal).
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and since, some individual members of the group have been en-
thusiastic supporters of its implementation, while others have
continued to oppose it.
Such positions result from personal decisions on current
political options. The principles that the Group has sought to
articulate over the years continue to unite it, even though the
individual application of those principles allied to tactical con-
siderations has resulted in opposing stances. This paradoxical
situation may be easier to understand if one takes account of the
remarkable similarities between the practical proposals of the
Belfast Agreement and the suggestions put forward by the Cado-
gan Group in its first pamphlet in 1992.
The Group then argued for a settlement based on the prin-
ciple that constitutional change in Northern Ireland could come
about only with consent; Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitu-
tion had to be changed to end the territorial claim, and the An-
glo-Irish Agreement had to be replaced. It proposed a power-
sharing executive in Northern Ireland guaranteeing the minor-
ity a place in government, and special measures to recognize and
to remedy the disadvantaged position that the minority commu-
nity found itself in as regards, for example, employment. The
Group proposed a new Cooperation Agreement with Dublin,
which would have a North-South Ministerial Council to promote
maximum cooperation between the two parts of Ireland. It sug-
gested a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland and proper consider-
ation for minority concerns. It proposed some institutional rec-
ognition of the oneness of these islands, not unlike the British-
Irish Council of the Belfast Agreement.
In many respects, the Belfast Agreement represented a sig-
nificant scaling down of what had been proposed in the
Frameworks in 1995, notably as regards rhetoric, cross-border
bodies and relations with the European Union. All of these as-
pects had been sharply criticized by the Group in Lost Accord.
What, then, if anything, is wrong with the Belfast Agree-
ment? The unease shared by Group members who support the
Agreement and by those who do not has three main causes. The
first relates to the circumstances in which the Agreement was
reached. The second concerns the rewriting of recent history
and the debasement of language that is involved. The third is
that the Agreement entrenches rather than challenges the myths
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and misconceptions that have long underlain the divisions in
Northern Ireland.
No democrat can be happy with the large degree of ap-
peasement of terrorism that underlies the Agreement. The pur-
suit of a settlement inclusive of people long denounced as ter-
rorists with no place in civilized society was based on the belief
that these terrorists could not be defeated. For almost a decade
now, the new consensus has been to persuade the terrorists to
move away from terrorism, to negotiate with them, to treat them
with a measure of respect, almost as honorable, if mistaken ene-
mies to be accommodated, not defeated. This is appeasement.
The pursuit of peace is the highest of goals. If it can be
achieved, even with a measure of appeasement, then it is worth-
while. This is the strongest argument for the Belfast Agreement.
It still leaves the appalling truth that in the second half of the
twentieth century a small subversive group ready to employ ruth-
less terror against the civilian population cannot be defeated in a
democratic society where it commands only tiny minority sup-
port. Taking the context of the island as a whole, two demo-
cratic legitimate governments have been forced to reach an ac-
commodation with an extreme Republican movement never en-
joying as much as five percent support on the island.
Many defenders of the Agreement, and some of those who
helped to negotiate it, recognize that. Their argument is that
peace has been bought, and that the price paid in actual conces-
sions has been modest. Republican terrorists have settled, not
for a united Ireland, but for a place in the sun, prisoner release,
and seats in a partitionist Assembly and Executive.
But part of the price has also been a blatant re-writing of
history. The consensual distortion of events and of language
that is now deemed a necessary part of the peace process is more
of a problem than some of the actual concessions. Thus, ter-
rorists are to be allowed, it would seem, to hold on to illegally
held arms and explosives for an interim period while their repre-
sentatives are installed in government; they are not required to
surrender such arms, but to decommission them over a pro-
longed period. It is now forgotten that the Mitchell Report rec-
ommendation was that decommissioning should take place dur-
ing multi-party negotiations, not before or after them. In fact,
no arms were given up during negotiations. None, apart from a
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very small loyalist- consignment, has been given up during almost
one year of implementation of the Agreement, and the IRA con-
tinues to say it has no intention of giving up arms.
The terrorists' representatives also talk of "equality"; they
present their terror as an armed struggle in pursuit of an equal-
ity, which has been denied them, and by implication denied to
the entire nationalist population in Northern Ireland. The
Agreement, with its vague use of the term "equality" and the ill-
defined concept of parity of esteem, again surrenders terminol-
ogy not just to the terrorist, but to a particular and highly con-
testable understanding of the whole problem. In what sense has
equality been deliberately denied to anyone in Northern Ire-
land? Only the ideologue nationalist who believes that Northern
Ireland has no right to exist can believe that he has been un-
justly denied his place in society.
Many of these concessions of language and rhetoric have
been described as "necessary nonsense" or small ground given in
return for what amounts to a de facto surrender and an accept-
ance, in the main, of the constitutional status quo. There is
much in that argument, but it still rewards the terrorists for
agreeing to stop using terror, and by implication accepts that
they had a right to use it in the past. Convicted terrorists are
released early, before arms are surrendered and without any ac-
knowledgement of wrongdoing because it is "part of the agree-
ment." This is not just morally distasteful, it is paying Danegeld.
The third concern is perhaps more fundamental. When the
Cadogan Group published Northern Limits in 1992, its proposals
for a solution, similar in many respects to the current Agree-
ment, were based on one key foundation. This was the general
acceptance, by all, that partition was not the root cause of
trouble in Ireland, but a reasonable, even inevitable if untidy
means of resolving the basic unionist-nationalist division among
the people of the island. Any solution, therefore, had to lie in
the direction of accepting the reality of partition, and seeking to
ensure that all could live with it in maximum equity and content-
ment.
Such an approach goes beyond the consent principle, which
essentially grants the right of self-determination to the people of
Northern Ireland. But the approach only goes beyond the con-
sent principle to the extent that it acknowledges the reality that
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consent to Irish unity is not forthcoming, now or in the foresee-
able future, and should not therefore be presented as a realistic
option. But the Belfast Agreement deliberately avoids any such
finality. As one academic commentator puts it, the beauty of the
Agreement is that both nationalists and unionists have sound
reasons for their respective assessments of its merits. 3 That is,
both can convince themselves that they have had the better of
the bargain. It was that fact that was crucial in obtaining an
agreement to which both unionists and Sinn F~in could assent.
But securing agreement in the hot-house atmosphere of high
pressure negotiation fast approaching, and even passing, a fixed
deadline may not offer the best foundation for a permanent or
even long-term settlement, particularly if principles are forgot-
ten in the process.
For example, the new wording for Articles 2 and 3 of the
Irish Constitution prescribed by the Agreement was meant to
end the territorial claim and enshrine consent. But it removes
only the explicit claim, leaving an implied one and much of the
nationalist myth on which it is based. The name of the southern
state remains Ireland, an implicit claim to the whole of the is-
land. The revised Article 2 seeks to define the Irish nation as
everyone born on the island. Article 1 continues to assert the
sovereign right of this Irish nation to choose its own form of
government. This is still the language of traditional nationalism,
ignoring reality and asserting the right of the Irish "nation" to
ownership of the island;
Central to the whole document is the concept of "separate
but equal." Northern Ireland is deemed divided between union-
ists and nationalists, and from now on these two tribes must have
equal say in everything. This is not just a question of equality
before the law, or of equal rights to vote, or of freedom of reli-
gion, of expression, or respect for cultural identity, all of which
already exist. This is a question of a basic equality between the
political stances of unionism and nationalism, that is between
accepting and supporting the existence of the state, and re-
jecting its legitimacy and seeking to dismantle it.
The hard-pressed negotiator, desperate for a formula that
13. Brendan O'Leary, The Nature of the Agreement (Nov. 26, 1998),John Whyte
Memorial Lecture, Queen's University, Belfast. This lecture also forms the basis of Pro-
fessor O'Leary's contribution to this present volume.
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might be acceptable, may well seize upon such fudges and ambi-
guities. The analyst, or, for want of a better word, the intellec-
tual, removed from the heat of negotiation, may be much more
conscious of the contradictions involved, and of the bending, or
setting aside, of truths and principles. It is his role in society to
continue to reassert those principles and to warn the negotiators
of the dangers of ignoring them.
Over the course of the peace process, those who have ex-
plored and articulated these principles may appear to have been
against the process and to have been proved wrong in the end by
the Belfast Agreement. But it could be that their contribution
also helped to shape the Agreement, reducing the amount of
nonsense that was deemed necessary and strengthening those
voices arguing for a sensible approach to institutional innova-
tion.
Their contribution may well be more important than ever in
the implementation of the Agreement, as they continue to ex-
pose the distortions of history and language built into it. Many
who voted for the Agreement did so with misgivings, but in the
hope that the compromises and concessions that it contained
would enable the extreme nationalists and terrorists to come to
terms with the wrongness of their methods and allow a wide-
spread re-examination of traditional political attitudes to begin.
So far, this has not happened. Terrorist prisoners are released
with no public, or private, admission that they were rightly im-
prisoned for appalling crimes. Spokesmen for terrorism, it
would seem, may be about to take their seats in government
while the terrorist organizations retain their subversive structure,
their illegal arms, and their selective use of terror. In the near
future it will be possible for many, particularly those outside
Northern Ireland, to look back on the past thirty years and to
reflect that it was tragic but necessary that so many had to die so
that inclusiveness and equality could be enshrined in the Agree-
ment.
That would be a tragic misreading of history, taken almost
verbatim from the Sinn Fin script. It has been said that those
who ignore history are forced to relive it. The danger now is that
the terrorism of the past thirty years is being decriminalized.
There is also the danger that the lessons drawn from recent his-
tory will be that the IRA emerged undefeated, that the armed
struggle produced medium-term political victories by forcing
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unionists into coalition with republicans and by winning many
rhetorical concessions to nationalism.
These ambiguities, coupled with the exhaustion of the ter-
rorists after thirty years, may produce some years of comparative
peace in Northern Ireland. But the fear is that they may leave
unimpaired the cult of physical force in Irish nationalism, and
the belief among extreme loyalists that retaliatory violence is the
only means to combat it. This must be considered within ar-
rangements, which rigidify and institutionalize the dividing lines
in society, in the softening of which must lie the real hope of
settlement.
As the Northern Ireland problem has attracted more inter-
national attention, a growing "peace industry" surrounding it
has stimulated a raft of suggestions and analyses deemed innova-
tive and imaginative. Both local activists and observers from
outside, mostly well-intentioned, have offered analyses and
sought to draw parallels with other conflicts-South Africa, for
example-that are impossible to sustain and that are, overall,
unhelpful and misleading.
The most pernicious of these, perhaps, has been the Euro-
pean example, the constant assertion that the process of integra-
tion in Europe, and in particular the principles and mechanisms
of the European Union, offer a pattern for reconciliation in Ire-
land, and indeed for some form of Irish unification or joint sov-
ereignty. The European Union certainly has enabled former en-
emies to live together in peace, and its Member States share
their sovereignty to a considerable degree in common institu-
tions. But the European Union is a community of Member
States, all of which entered willingly into the treaty arrangements
governing the Union, and within which all share sovereignty to
the same degree. In the case of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, or
in various scenarios for joint-authority, there is agreement be-
tween two units, the British and Irish Governments, on how they
together will run one small area, Northern Ireland. Northern
Ireland, however, was not consulted over the arrangements, and
within it a majority has repeatedly said it does not accept them.
A genuine application of the European Union model to the
Northern Ireland problem would have to involve the two states,
the two islands, and all the distinct regions, with a sharing of
sovereignty all around, and with the ultimate goal of political
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union of all parts. That is, there would have to be a recreation of
the union between Great Britain and Ireland. In this, as in other
instances, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the SDLP
and the Dublin Government have embraced such arguments
mainly to cloak old-fashioned and unsustainable claims in a ve-
neer of modernity and internationalism.
In the drama of the search for peace in Northern Ireland,
the Cadogan Group has been a bit player, if that. The purpose
of this Essay is not to give it significance, or even to justify its
views. The purpose is to reflect on the importance in any such
situation of individuals and groups ready to try, on the basis of
individual judgment and some scholarship, to assert basic princi-
ples and to seek to focus attention on the fundamentals, to ques-
tion received wisdom, and to subject the consensus bandwagon
to rigorous testing.
Politicians and negotiators may need recourse to some de-
ceit and much glossing over of history to bring all parties around
a table and to persuade them within a given time to assent to a
set of proposals. But unless the deceit and the glossing over are
continually challenged, agreement is unlikely to evolve into set-
tlement.
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